

۱) اولاد - دیندار

17 Feb. 1935 Bureau of Fish and Wildlife Comm., Wash.
D.C. and to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

1st meeting at State 17 Oct. Held in 3 Rooms. Held at 10.4.16 Oct. invited P-VP; McE for Ontario, + Young, Stewart, Stenbackman. ; T.

Ball: treat this as a sort of U2 incident. Must have occurred as a mistake, or unauthorized. Extremely limited air strike. Announce that flying in direct contradiction on what he promised. A summit.

McN: No meeting with Pres until tomorrow morning. Address ourselves to alternatives. Reduce to writing for afternoon. Meet again this evening. 1. Facts. 2. Alternatives. 3. Systematic review of consequences.

McC: What we see today is only phase 1 of ultimate objective. Base policy on pro

...three sites MRBM, ...noknowledge of where warheads are. Unexplained construction in very large cave 5 miles to west of site. Useless with conventio al warheads. Reckless to assume no atomic warheads. Atomic bombs for 21s and Il28?

5. Have in port series of ships in port with 63 boxes, not like any we have every seen. 20 ships on way, 8 of which can carry weapons.

7. Area near Havana could be proper for warhead. Secure underground installation.

McB: Major Soviet base, not support of Castro, major threat against US.

Thomp: Could be bargaining point Turkey.

McB: Could be persuaded not to use (?)

McC: Not Turkey. (?)

Soviet intentions:

McC: 1) Provide C. retaliation

2) Attack against US

3) Hallmarks of accomplishment; show what Soviets

4) Political trading

Tay: Gambit to get us involved.

When decision made: June, July.

Thomp: Wants a showdown with best chance of coming out with Berlin, bases, disarmament. We jumped gun by finding out.

Decision made prior to Pres public statement. Would he deny or defend?

Alternatives:

(WHO?)

1. How many sorties. May be on low side.

a. MRBMs 4 area, 23 targets; 75 large bombs, 52 sorties, low level.

b. plus airfield plus IL28 crates: 100 sorties

c. plus SAM sites and air capable targets, 51 areas: 200 sorties, 350-400 large weapons.

d. plus significant military, not pre-invasion: 500
1 day.

e. plus invasion, 1400 targets; 4000 weapons, 2000 sorties. Several days. None include forces threatening Guantanamo.

3. What alternatives.

A.G. Every action unpleasant to K.
should be surveilled by State

Surveillance

Take out if against L.A. or US

Open statement to take care of domestic
How important to let him off hook
Pull women and children out of Moscos and satellites.

I Pol

II Minimum to meet domestic and L.A.

III Military ~~other~~ alternatives.

Threat to Carib area.

Political action will lose surprise. If you lose surprise then..

I (a) 50 targets. leave Castro with wound.

Taylor: Minimum air attack on US?

Ultimatum concurrently with strike.

Can't guarantee

N. Offensive weapons as sole objective.

Johnson: Buy off

restore relations

Can you stop ~~me~~ after 50 sorties or 400 sorties without invasion.

R: Congress called to recognize a state of war

To emphasize difference between this action and war.

Division of 2 alliances

NATO most

Bring about fall

Threats to: Berlin, Iran, Turkey, Quemoy-Matsu, Korea, Pakistan,
Finland?

Disarray in alliance

Depends on prior preparation. Consultation. Advance notice. Opportunity
to get out by ad. notice.

Oct. 18, White House // 20

R. Is it necessary to take action.

No action, would underline to allies

a) grd to grd, gravest issues would arise

b) effect on Sovs. If we unable, greatly increase their confidence.

c) Gravest problem internally.

Action serious risks. Counteraction probably heavier. Reaction Korea to Berlin to US.

To spread from 50/60 strikes would increase problem.

Unannounced unconsulted could have serious repercussions.

Different than Suez.

If we enter upon this path. No one can surely foresee the outcome.

Even without new info, probably result in great

Am. people willing to much. If good conscience. Theory of the case.

Guns of August. Is trip necessary. WWII clear. Korean got into considerable trouble. Militate in favor of consultation K and invocation Rio.

1st. K might back down

2d. Rio Pact strongest position, other declaration of war.

Further info, dec. of national importance and declaration of war, maybe best course. Larger problem. Larger way.

Alternative short strike. Larger problem, challenge goes up a great deal.

Bohlen: Existence can't be tolerated.

Two means, diplomatic or military.

If determination firm, no danger.

Tone and tenor important.

Strike will lead to ge. war. Allied reaction dead against us.

Declaration invaluable.

Limited quick action illusory.

McN: Assume no nuclears. I or II (Page 1?) inconclusive, costs not worth. ((I think: I, MRBMs, II plus airfields, II28s, III plus SAMs and air capable targets, IV plus significant military.))

II better than I. More sorties now necessary. Would verge into III.

Taylor: II would require III, SAM sites. Still require for surveillance. III could be done in a day. At end AF nearly destroyed.

McN: Evaded R's question. How does it change military balance. Not at all. Chiefs others don't agree. Pol. problem. Conditioning K, allies.

H: Whatever action going to cause lots of people to think mad.

5.

T. Energy with which moving. Any time operational. I128-- now ideal time-- Mobile
can't take out this threat from air. Can't prevent progress. Takes dip or invasion. As to mobile, it may be already too late.

McC: Now not Soviet. Not members Warsaw Pact. Sovs might have way to back out.

H: K's reply Berlin, Turkey, Italy.

^{Bylin} T: ((air strike?)) Kill Russians. Prefers blockade, surveillance, legality,

R: Our action aimed at Cuba.

^{Bylin} T: can assume he will want to talk. Will be negotiative.

A.G. He blockade Berlin
tradeoff.

McC: Eisenhowers pts: missiles' intolerable
Limited raise doubts in rest of world
Go to jugular. Havana.
Minimum loss of life.

R. Will need national emergency or declaration of war.

Th: M and Castro has to go.
Bertter from blockade.

Dillon: What could K do that would satisfy us.

Th: Most is to say won't do any more, we can check

Th: British would want us to have told K

Ball: If he did it after fait accompli, are you better off

McC: K can't believe we don't know. He would lock us into negotiation.

H: Only out give up Turkey base.

McN: Several hundred Russians killed. Strong riposte.

Ball: Difficult to overestimate impact of no warning politically.

Th: Precipitate real Berlin crisis.

H: does he invade or blockade.

N: blockade.

H: How about declaration of war. Then you have to invade.

B. If not act of hostility against everyone else.

Mex, Bol, Brazil, Ecuador?

B. Blockade without ultimatum, impossible situation with rocketry.

Th. Posture, if things stop we don't act.

6.

B. If K recognizes C. lost

Tomorrow--announce. Call Congress back Monday. Every knows. Take out Saturday and airforce.

R. A little more time, something may crack.

Th. K took this on his own. "il. concurred at time of U2. negotiation not entirely to be rejected. Won't wait, come over. Playing Russian roulette.

H. If he responds, giving us an ultimatum, are we worse off.

H. Invasion not same as taking out bases. His response may be the same.

A.G. Would anyway take 7 days. Could always hold out.

R. Reinforce Guantanamo and take out dependents. 6 M in Viequest. 200 to 400 air strikes. Take high ground.

H. Cruisers return fire.

R. Gromyko;; read his statement. 5 pts why not relevant.
Rio Treaty. Status quo--Hungary--penetrating Hemisphere.
NATO direct response to threat to Berlin.

McN: split into 2 course

1. Slow: Pol plus blockade

2. Fast: Notify plus military action and blockade

Taylor: Monday--better--Tuesday best--Saturday possible.

McN Intell better by Friday.

McN: Two groups. basic alternatives. Minimum action forceful action.
How Sovs and others response. Air Blockade without strike.
 don't kill Cubans or Russians
 might get deal
 ~~give him~~ let him continue to build,

Ball: recognition of state of war. The Pres would ask Congress to recognize (or Pres declare pursuant to resolution).

7. Oct. 18, State ~~Ad. Sec. 1967~~

Eisenhower. No surprise. Thought offensive buildup would occur.
Expressed criticism of handling. Present situation
would prove to be intolerable. Discussinss of no avail.
Blockade, difficult when stopped. Capt. refused. Bring
to Port.
Limited, indecisive, irritating to world opinion. Great
fear in all areas where Sovs could respond. Turkey, Pakistan.
Korean analogy. 4th day Truman reversed.
Leaned to military action to cut off Havana. Such a plan
more decisive than landing and slow type invasion.

Cuban deployed forces. 19000 in 25 miles, ~~31~~ 31,000 in 50
50,000 in 100 miles.

BBk

Bohlen: Exchange with Castro, K
Notification to MacM, NATO, OAS and Turks
Then strike limited to offensives
If strike without notice, unpredictable results.

May be pushing to see how far they can go. Get 50 sites. real accretion.
Lenin dictum: must advance, still withdraw.

Rusk: OAS. Not too much difficulty in getting 2/3 d's for declaration
the threat to Hemisphere. Will take 2 or 3 days get action in OAS.

R: Congress state of war directed specifically against these missiles.
Simultaneously in Oas etc. Cut through mass of legalities.

Objection to talking

McN: they can be redeployed.

A.G. We don't know now that some aren't hiddne and operational now.

Option I: only one politically possible without notice to allies.

Rusk: Send private C and K. Give them last clear chance.

Acheson: If you do this ball it all up. Counter-ultimatum. Must act
at once.

1. Do it with no talk.

Some response

Plan

Berlin, Korea, Turkey, Quemoy, Japan.

2. Alert every one on short time basis, fully and persuasively.

NATO-OAS by high level people.

Former Pres.

3. Fly over air borne division to Europe.

4. Shouldn't worry about election.

5. Wise Pres cancel campaign speeches.

Take it much better than anyone would suspect.
Pleasure we do act.

9. Thursday, Oct 18, White House 11:00

- McN: 1. Pol discussion, no mil.
2. Blockade, concurrent Pol.
3. air strike, concurrent Pol.

Blockade more under control. Otherwise set if up for K. Broken alliances.
Lost Berlin. Excessive price.

McB. Gravest issues. Intolerable to us. We endure, every day. Too much self respect to respond by act of aggression. Soviet held to account.
Creates situation can regard Cuba only as pawn. Responsibility of USSR
Invite K to come at once. Larger issue is freedom. Don't provoke to pull fabric apart. Hazard in Berlin.

T. Better if we don't hesitate. Look at what happens if we don't act.

McC. Better risk with action than none.

McN. Must act. But act so we maintain control of events. While would like to take out, but leads to unpredictable response

Offensive weapons blockade

Can tighten as we go along. Might have allies.

Intolerable condition. Don't say what we will do.

Low level pictures.

48 hours partially effective blockade

McB Why do we need to hasten on blockade. Pres statement. announce what we will do. Sunday night. Pictures.

OAS-- Acheson go to NATO and governments. Personal emissaries, Italy England, Turkey. Pictures

1030 at State.

Martin: How can Pres do this without declaration of war.

Stevenson down tomorrow.

Description of blockade--not to bring down Cuba. Offensive weapons-- with or without POL. Priority to Soviet. board. get instructions from State. perfunctory stop others.

8.

Assert from Madison and Monroe....

A.G. Three or four alternatives

a. Letters to K and Castro

Estimated response

Then what happens

Go to OAS, UN

b. Military action initially. 50 or 200, results around world.
What Russians would do. War. Turkey.

c. Military action after letters

d. Blockade, declaration of war, after preliminary steps

3. McC8s invasion

((Several days before the 15th, N. was convinced by a briefing by a Navy captain in DIA that the Sovs were probably putting in offensive missiles in Cuba; he informed _____ of his conviction. Later, X asked him, "How did you know, before everyone else?" Others found their skepticism dissolving, but they didn't share N's conviction. However, even for N, "A certainty is very different from a high probability.")

N was at State with R in dinner with Shroeder when Hilsman called R. They were in the midst of a discussion of Cuba. R came back very pale. After dinner, he took N out on terrace and told him. They discussed alternatives. N had already thought about problem, concluded that invasion looked very bad--would be a bloody mess--and that air strike looked better; but that too, at that moment, didn't look good (especially a surprise attack, with political repercussions) ~~(he wouldn't have necessarily done it)~~ He didn't immediately consider blockade. He thought we would just have to eat it. Rm felt about the same way. (He wouldn't necessarily have predicted this reaction). Both agreed, it was a hideous prospect.

(N also worried about military/strategic aspects; the short warning times, Southern route. He was probably one of the few to take this seriously).

Early the next morning N had to go to give a speech, by plane; he missed first discussions; but starting from 17th, was in every discussion. Invasion: McCone, Dillon, Lemay (preceded by large air strike). Blockade followed by air strike (at first, preceded by declaration of war): Nitze, McNamara.

(Who for surprise strike? Ball? JFK? Bundy? Who for eating it: Gil?)

"The way that an ultimatum comes to be considered is that plans for action are developed, then decision-maker comes to look for some alternative to having to use them; he decides to try warning.

State may come in early with a proposal for warning, 80% likely to work; but DOD worries about the military consequences of that 20% chance of having to carry out (and DOD may neglect the political consequences of carrying out threat, which State deals with).

(This seems to be the way the direct threat was actually generated; at the point when plans for air strike had been generated and ExComm was ready to use them "if necessary," yet was repelled enough by prospect to try direct approach to avoid it: despite the risks of that approach (K commitments, threats to US, public and allies, allied pressures) which had deterred it earlier.) (Pressure to make actual military strike a "fait accompli," rather than encourage opponent and allies to try to influence one.)

Oct 18 afternoon

Rusk: Cannot accept operational MRBMs. On both political and military grounds. Pres has said grd to grd raises most serious set of problems. Would invite most serious exchanges, commit Soviets, talk while more erected.

Suggests Tuesday inform certain key allies, Mac deG, Adm, possibly the Turks. Possibly L.A. 45 Pres.

Along about Wed strike these missiles. Simultaneously, public statement K, telling. Same time OAS, SC, NATO Council. Get this strike over with.

If attack in Korea, meet. Berlin, we ~~must~~ know what to do. Q.M. not likely.

In out public statement, accppanying, any kind of counter-action~~xx~~ against U.S.--condition of war. Surveillance of Cuba.

UN..we will get into overseas bases. Turn into Geneva type.

US allies in general encouraged by show of firmness. India, etc. probably somewhat restrained. We cast blank checks in that situation. Want and demand their support

Critical is what we could say to Russians, and in public announcement. If we can handle as first step, take out missiles. Won't such problem. Lots of subsequent decisions.

Otherwise will go down with a whimper. May be better with bang.

In opening statement cover, Intolerable, continue to take whatever action necessary.

Not just actual effect, but also what we have declared.

Not too concerned about argument about Turkey.

Have record of whole post-war period. International law reflection of US policy in this Hemisphere. May have dialectical argument. Depends on who prepared stare who down.

Problem of danger to Venezuela, etc. No good knocking out 16 missiles lose 3 countries.

McN: How assure Castro and commanders truly understand your message.

R: Put message in Swiss hands. Talking about 50 strike plan.

McN: Migs flushed. Temptation attack Guantanamo. Put 400 planes including strike over Cuba.

R: Big strike destroys political effect of limited attacks.

McB: Principle that sensitive areas not to be turned into nuclear bases. Be lin, Iran, Laos. In all three we have been willing to see undertakings that they not be so stationed. Italy-Turkey to be equated with NATO; clear democratic majorities supported our being invited to do this because of direct Soviet threat. Might be end of Morocco, Wheelus. New regime on bases we can live with.

Not a Pearl Harbor. ~~xx~~

11. State Dept, AM, Friday Oct 19

Friday, Oct 19

McC briefing. NIE. Grymyko.

Johnson: Doesn't see problem in establishing. Must get OAS ratification. UN can get jurisdiction. Problem to maintain legality. Declaration of war not required. All inclusive vs. selective. Prize court. Normally wartime, status of war. Any state has right to preserve status quo if promptly taken to multilateral. Else Art. 51, self defense measure.

Meeker:

Declaration of war not only not necessary but would get us into additional problems both under international law and under charter. Present situation not one of armed attack or imminent armed attack. Leaves question of whether we justified in preventing further shipments. Under international law and treaties not entitled to use force unless we procure measure voted by OAS. Can argue special regime of law under which we have rights other countries don't have. If we take action first then gox to L.A. govs. Couldn't get others to go along. Could announce that we are planning to go to OAS.

Problem is to maintain and convince we are legal. Need decision under 6 and 8. Then in legal and practical position to fend off attacks in Sec Council. Better position than if we claim right to act.

Martin: 14 needed. Uruguay, Mex, Brazil, Ecuador, Chile marginal. Legally should we refer to it as defensive quarantine.

Acheson:

If discussion meant merely quarantine means nothing at all. Risks security of country for legal formalities? Any who wants to understand can understand. Depends on what it is you want to do. ((Security jeopardized how? Defiance; humiliation; effect on expectations of Soviets crucial; and to this, our warnings, predictions, and change of status quo crucial.)) ((Similar issues in Suez: Nasser vs. British.)) ((Some military/strategic impact could be claimed there.

Any Dillon agrees.

McN:

- 1) Pure political moves
- 2) Immediate stop import, ultimately complete
- 3) Full strike against dangerous forces. 300-400 sorties against Russian 200 against forces ringing Guantanamo.

Pres. tentative decision Sunday; blockade Monday.

McB disturbed,

Alternating between enough or nothing.

Taylor:

McN: Need to think of time. Can't announce blockade Sunday night. Air strike. Chiefs prefer Monday or Tuesday. need 24 hours notice.

Sorenson: Concern that decision had become unstuck. Feels time is of the essence.

12.

Meeker: Who gov in power after strike?

Rusk:

Need two courses of action

Chiefs--McCone--Dillon--McBundy ((air strike?))

McN--AG--Ball-- blockade.

Difficulty, Pearl Harbor.

living under gun

Analyze fact coldly just as

Show down better now

but perhaps not

Thompson: Clear that we are heading for a showdown. Getting into area where surprise attack.

Acheson: Either decision very hard. If you are having showdown must run into these dangers.

Weapons in Siberia not as dangerous as in Cuba is false.

Why are we interested

If blockade then you can take out

Has indicated can pull tail feathers out of eagle

This is the moment, won't come again.

Prepare him as best we can.

All elements have been brought out.

Get him ready for the decision.

Detailed scenario. Telegrams, whole works.

Afternoon, Friday 19

Meeker: Art 53 provides Sec Council must authorize enforcement action by regional group. We might have seven votes in favor position that not enforcement action. Rio Treaty states use of armed force not obligatory. Not order, preventing arrival. Obvious answer is votes.

Rusk: Shouldn't we ourselves inform Sec Council pursuant to Art 54. Get it out of UN in general assembly. Sec Gen in direct touch how to get timing settled. Do at same time as you go to OAS. Do it that night, asking meeting next morning. Soviet Pres.

A.G. Question of whether you could announce surveillance and if they continue to make offensive. Question of whether or not to put in responsibility of Soviets.

McN Is objective of policy including blockade to secure removal of missiles.

Rusk: Hopefully followed by other steps which would give us possibility of taking them

McN: Either we blockade and accept the missiles or we eventually take them out.

McB: Don't announce invasion. Concentrating on missiles will have same effect.

13.

McN. Our intention at start is important. Blockade route, some degree of vagueness as to how. Eventually you bargain away something else and come out with missiles out.

Dillon: Can you go on for more than week.

Thompson: Soviets will keep control. Possibility of loss of control. But we can play same game. Strength of your position is that eventually you will knock them out.

Sorenson: Blockade go on until missiles out.

Taylor: Internal decision to go forward with maximum preparations.

Rusk: If you take this step we will pull out of Berlin: Macmillan, de Gaulle?

Gaylor: If alliance is going to break up, it will.

Rusk: Just wanted to mention.

State Department, PM, night of 19 Oct Rusk

Start with blockade. If not observed by Soviets Hit.

- 1) Preemptive strike on their power
- 2) No question, if lots of Russians killed, will take forceful action.
Turks, Italians
Attacks on missile bases, or threat unless withdraw.
- 3) Berlin
- 4) Conference on peace treaty
- 5) Pakistan or Iran
- 6) Macmillan agree, at least until women evacuated.
- No polarises in England or Germany.
- 7) UN

Johnson--Nitze, night of Oct 19

Assume blockade instituted after: a) announcement to public; b) declaration of war; c) unsuccessful communication to K and/or C.

I. Limited blockade, only against offensive weapons, directed to immediate threat, grd to grd missiles, combat aircraft. What's necessary to make work. Objective not bringing down Castro but offensive threat.

- 1) Soviets acquiesce--what does this mean. (Problems of subs and planes?)
Would anything less than inspection of cargos be acceptable? No.
Requires stopping and boarding or being willing to turn around.
- 2) Probability of Sov acquiescence? High but not certain.

14.

What ripostes available to them, assuming acquiescence.

a) Comparable action re Berlin ineffective. Therefore they would have to take non-comparable action which could include, denial of access to Berlin by American forces. Of little effect if only on ground but could be significant if air access blocked. Would claim of equivalent effect.

They could stop all Allied military access, or impose full blockade of Berlin. Our riposte, full blockade of Cuba and/or execution contingency plans for Berlin. Question, would it not be better to separate Berlin and Cuba and respond by action in Berlin on Berlin, not combined basis. But K may link.

Damage to Commies is largely failure to back Castro. He would have to offset this.

(Does blockade make Berlin blockade more likely. This relates to limited indirect approach versus direct approach. Limited may help with Allies. May encourage K to 2 eyes for an eye approach.

b) Exercise maximum of their capabilities to bring about overthrow of Venezuela, Bolivia, Guantanamo, Ecuador, Dominican governments and substitution of United Front governments. Chance of success less under this assumption than under assumption broader or more direct action ...

c) World wide or local blockade against US shipments of offensive weapons systems to overseas bases. Our riposte would be to declare it an illegal blockade. (Few windows left in any US embassies. Campaigning against US overseas bases.)

d) Takeover Laos. Not likely under this hypothesis.

e) Encourage or permit Castro to use declaration of war as the peg on which to bring actions forcing us to more forceful measures. This depends on whether K wants us to invade Cuba. If provocation obvious allies will have more sympathy to our invasion but in long run US position could suffer.

General comments on this alternative

a) This alternative does not weaken Castro economically and therefore may need to extend...

b) Does not get rid of offensive systems now there. Warheads can be brought in by air, if not already there.

c) Talks and diplomatic activity will be goingblockade.

d) Low level air cover during blockade would mean loss of prestige for Castro. High level flights would not falter our penetration as directly.

e) Castro attacks on Guantanamo less likely if blockade limited and Sovs acquiesce. Castro attacks with Komars similar. Although, legally no objection.

2. Soviets do not acquiesce. a. What do they do locally. Cuban Komars? Russian subs. Planes from Cuba. Self defense of merchant men. Convoy. Not effective, but might lead to Russian loss of life.

b. Campaign in Security Council. At minimum, veto. At max, votes to defeat.

Add on statement that any further work on deployment offensive systems most serious consequences.
Then if he doesn't stop a week or two later we hit them.

But may we not be tangled up in negotiation.

We can add to pressure by expanding blockade.

We can also have worldwide blockade of USSR or NATO economic embargo.

In Phase II of contingency plans with pretty full mobilization.

During night, let draft by search.

Oct 20, Saturday
9, at 11:15? Pass Weekly News. 2:15, Planning Group, with Star, JH, Smith,
Nuc stor under construction at IRBMs
TU 114 Dakar could be carrying ... unusual plane
Poltava due Nov 2 80 ft.

Rusk: UN send group to all missile sites in world
Bring to Port the Polarises.

S: Need some major political initiative.

N: 10% accept 40% reject 50% counteroffer. ((problem of SU response?))

S: Are we prepared to do.

Thompson: Sovietest wouldn't consider for a moment elimination without removal what we have in Europe.

S. Open door to whole series of negotiations.

Bg Make offer to K to join us in making such

... assignments: Blockade in Pent: Anderson, Sharp, McNaughton
Taylor--Air Strike
Johnson--messages
McB-- strike
preliminary to K and C
tomorrow

Significant civil measures. No.

McC: Check readiness of missiles.
Pres here at 2:30.

Dillon: Is speech intended to lead to long course, or short. If latter change to

Ball: Transition from one to other.

A.G. Exclude strike if blockade.

McN: No commitment. Begin blockade. can't do

16.

Oct 20, Saturday, White House, 2:30

Briefing. 4 maybe 5 X 4 MREM
2 X 4 IRBM

16 weeks

Poltava 10 days

18 hours to ready. Mobil--to pre-surveyed sites. Can move away in minutes.

McN: 2 tracks. Blockade--supplement? By surveillance? military action?
negotiation? Ted speech thing to look at.
Removal might require Guantanamo, Jpeters, etc to be paid.

Ultimatum re subsequent strike unwise. Conditioning might reduce risk. Expand
mil. action hot pursuit, anti-SAM, ~~mit~~ economic strangulation might get
missiles out.

NIE Sovs. Concentrate on Pol. not forceful. Disadvantages. Long time.
Domestic. Strains on NATO. Negotiations against background weaker than had
appeared. Further military action might be required at worse time for us.
Least chance of allies.

((blockade?)) Avoid Pearl Harbor. Only course compatible with principles. Avoids
attack against potentially operational missiles. Avoids sudden military
move so forcefully that we quickly escalate.
Recommends blockade route.

P: Knew July, we would have blockaded. Same reasons then as now restrained us.
Deal with missiles that are there.

T. Danger of lanyard pulling ~~mit~~ slight. Piecemeal commitment unwise.

Taylor: We don't know how to put in air blockade.

McN: I would recommend we shoot them down if they think they carry warheads.

A.G. Great point that from now Castro will be able to do whatever he wants. Living
with nuclear threat forever.

Taylor: From then on shoot 100 ...a day with impunity.

Who for what. McB, Taylor, Dillon, McC and Chiefs with variations

P. Whatever we do all for it.
How successful can strike be.

T. Would hope 100% of those now identified.
McC 2/3 ...of mobile. Continue closest air surveillance.

T. Maximum chance against airplanes now.

R. Could they be decoys? B: Potemkin village. McB: not likely.
P: Planes don't bother. Have been living with that. Planes don't have
political impact.

17.

A.G. Possibility of blockade and 1 day. Hewill scatter his planes. Deploy.

McB Counterthreats.

McC Two routes can be merged. Don't like P.H. Demand.

D. Lose L.A. Must remove. Better with blockade, dismantle, inspection. 72 hours or perhaps more difficult. If Mc M. decision rt. then straight strike.

(ilpatric)

R.G. Chiefs plan 800 sorties. To initiate this kind of force is not kind we can take. Blockade.

McN: 800 plus 250 to support Guantanamo. Can't stop with this. Gov in chaotic state. Must think of accompanying with invasion. Inconceivable that Soviets will respond and then we respond. Leads to unpredictable but probable heavy

P. Chiefs~~xxxx~~ plan not surgical. Apt to grab.

Start with blockade, work cease, planes not uncrated. Can't be screwing about Italy or Turkey. Take out if the issue. K makes speech. pay no attention. Berlin--be prepared for. Will be reprisal. Continue to uncrate--Monday, Tuesday. Can we tell. Move trailers into woods. Can we see. By Thursday might have in woods.

Dillon: Inspection?

R. Do you publish pictures

P. Only thing is missiles. Don't care about planes.

T. Migs and SAMS.

A.G. Not overwhelming.

R. Would recommend you make decision in 2 chapters. Not effective consultation. No opportunity to reconsider. Doesn't foreclose. Grt. risks without compensation. Blockade not without risks.

Dillon: Reasonable low level surveillance., plus hot pursuit if attacked is something different.

McC: Warheads probably not there.

P. What defense against not in July.

B. Would have been in great trouble.

18.

R. Have been thinking. Observation teams to all countries to all except ...
having strategic nuclear missiles. Immediate freeze. Transparent.

P. Withdrawal of all missiles to home base?

R. 2d. Take note of security and put UN force in Cuba.

Stev: Gravest difficulties. Why we have bases, they can't. War fever.
Lose allies. Advantages in blockade. More likely OAS ~~approval~~ approval.
Object to eliminate without danger of escalation. Components of offer.
Observation teams. Guarantee of integrity. Withdrawal from Guantanamo,
All bases in context G.C.D. Caribbean defense treaty.

If no progress, substantive action. Hard to see where or how.

P. Can't give up Guantanamo at this point.
Missiles from foreign soil.

A.G. Give to Germany.

1. Prepare for first missiles
Evacuation Guantanamo.

T. Get in position for invasion. Yes.

Tell Turkey and Italy, not fire if attacked. Dismantle.
Low level photos.

I (N?) No prob. in invading. Give them excuse re Berlin. Probable we will
have to strike later in week.

1st just missiles now
" " 3 or 4 days

Missiles, planes, equipment, POL. This distinguishes between missile threat
and Castro.

P. 1st day? Technicians, can't do anything about.
P. Do this week. Quarantine.

P. Nuclear policy to France.
Command Post in McC's office.

Turks and Italians. action against

Anderson's office command post Chayes-Meeker

Nitze note, Oct 20: I would follow the clockade route, accompanying it with an

19.

Nitze note, Oct 20:

I would follow the blockade route, accompanying it with an offer of a political plan in UN. If, in two or three days, we had continuing evidence of progress in the construction of the missile bases, I would strike the minimum number of targets necessary to eliminate the main nuclear threat but with adequate force against each target.

I believe it highly unlikely that Soviets would strike SAC under conditions where SAC is fully alerted.

If the surviving Cuban missiles are used against the US I would invade Cuba, not use nuclears against Cuba. It might then, however, be necessary to make a purely compensatory attack against the USSR.

I do not believe effective action against missiles in Cuba complicates the Berlin problem. Our plans for Berlin all depend on the credibility of US firmness.

If we permit the Cuban missile affront to go unanswered in an effective way, I see no possibility of negotiations with Khrushchev except on his terms. In other words I believe we have accepted his version of Communist coexistence.

Bundy's Office

20.

Oct 21, Bundy's Office, 11 AM

Afternoon meeting. 1) Pres speech. 2) Sorenson will have 3d draft. Solid tomorrow. Preliminary statement.

Speech not sharply different

- Issues:
- 1) Invitation to Kh
 - 2) degree of coupling Berlin
 - 3) how specific on character of offensive threat
pt. of our lack of knowledge. full disclosure?
 - 4) other people should not be in
 - 5) no bases in Cuba
 - 6) quarantine blockade
 - 7) clarity or ambiguity of OAS, period of grace

interrelation between dip. and action scenarios. Proclamation.

don't use A hour, P in all new paper.

3d item on agenda, mil. scenario; steps taken, steps to be taken.

how conducted. Non-vital, preferably the rudder. Boarding party.

Rules of engagement Cuban aircraft; attacking coast, 3 mile lim
in position attack US air or ships. SAM attack on surveillance--go after
SAM. air or ground fire on Guantanamo

Berlin--Should some one talk about Berlin--in Press conf or in speech

2d and 3d moves. Rostow back, Barthoff (Charyk)

22. Oct 22, 11AM Nitze's office

Tactic of not demanding action of our allies, but instead indicating what we are prepared.

..Shouldn't throw past decisions to wind. Would give impression of panic. Soft pedal, predilegation, etc for the next few days.

Are there prompt actions which come to mind which would bolster alliance and or impress Soviets.

a) Evidences of allied solidarity. Some former restraints no longer necessary. Nuclear cooperation with French. French agreement. ((Pres?))

alerts

Additional deployment of nuclears to Europe. Fixed pit weapons.

Canada deployment of nucs. Merchant.

Holifield's concurrence

Approval on Bercon/Mercon

Deployment on additional divisions. Coupled with Allied action. JCS studying.

Publicly appear as

Subdelegate to Germans

Why didn't we consult: Without a first action, Sovs could have done all kinds of things. Their own security at stake. Couldn't afford to announce fact without an adequate action.

Norstad keep the wheel.

23. Oct 22, White House, 11:30 Cabinet Room

Personal message to commanders in Italy and Turkey. Send documents to Bundy.

White House, Oct 22, 3 PM NSC

Macmillan letter

Native resolution sicklied o'er with pale cast of thought.

A.G. Illegal if we don't get OAS. Support of OAS essential. Get 14 votes. Nations aren't going to turn down lightly.

Hilsman: briefing. 24, 12. 4X4 in full operational 2X4 on 25th and 29th. mobile--might suddenly shift.

12 IRBMs in Dec.

P. Feeling to reflect. Sing one song. Support the final action. No division. Every course taken, other would have been better. Eisenhower, Truman, Hoover.

Reasons against air strike:

1) Couldn't get all

No knowledge whether any in positions to be fired.

2) Knew where 30 of 60 are.

Pearl Harbor, without consultation.

Don't know how to get them out. May be we going down course

Decided to do something because of commitment. Secret way. To do nothing, produce chance of Berlin.

Might face in Berlin in 3 months. Balance of power had shifted.

May have to invade. What are we going to do if U2 shot down. If work continues.

1 SAM or all. Meet tomorrow and decide.

No one thought nothing should be done.

Didn't give up on quick strike until Sunday, invasion required.

Have increased problem by warning.

Pearl Harbor would have excused very serious retaliation.

A.G.: 1st question. Why action not earlier. ~~Quarantine~~ Quarantine in August. Couldn't have gotten 14 votes. In Europe viewed Berlin in jeopardy because of fixation on Cuba. Declaration of war in isolated position.

2d: surveillance until Tuesday. August 29--nothing there. Sept. we got suspicion. Cloud cover. 15 refugee reports. no confirmation. Awaiting has basis. Probably didn't have. Sovietologists said no missiles.

2B.

3d. Why not hit. R. Obligation to OAS.

P. Wants everyone to understand.

4. What is distinction to Jupiters--

57 decision by NATO. In face of statement USSR. equipping, demand that Europe move.

Move taken secretly. Departure. No need Tass statement. Offensive in Cuba different.

Provocative change in delicate balance. Resulted from frustration about Berlin. Squirming about his commitment.

R. ...don't say we considered air attack. No alternative.

T. How about overt moves. Tell press. obviously taking precautionary moves. Not in public interest to ask about. Prepared for any eventuality. Not included in Pres policy. Voluntary censorship. Air-POL, matters not wise to comment on. Prepared to quarantine by whatever means if needed. Call up? Nat emergency. Keep under review from day to day.

Is this an act of war. Not of itself. Depends on intentions. Stop all ships.

Air action just Pearl Harbor. Invasion no orders.

(that morning: ships turned around, info)

25. Situation Room Oct 24 3 PM

Intercept--via 6th fleet

a) advantages
dead seriousness
get look at hardware
you make them look ridiculous

b) disadvantages
British won't like it
rubbing it in, narrowing golden bridge of retreat
strains language

...
Rostow: signal seriousness. test of will and determination.
Importance to negotiations to have firm blockade.

~~XXXXXX~~
Oct 25, lunch with McN

Castro delivered Donovan list. 27% baby food. plasma 3 times annual requirement. Deal still considered as on. Great worry in Havana.

Pr

Oct 26, 10 AM, White House

Within Cuba, worry of invasion, bombing, or uprising. Sanchez expects to see prisoners.

A.G. Shouldn't indicate deal off. Donovan under control.

Dillon: Let's see whether we really want to go down this track. Might get wound up in spreading effects. Put confrontation on basis air action in Cuba. Don't confront Sovis at sea.

Cah measure progress. Announce we continue day and night. 10 right away. 4 at night. 10 flare per target.

R. On political side. Stevenson made Zorin look ridiculous.

...
Two other tracks. a) Encourage Brazilians to push hard for atom free L.A. Wouldn't involve Puerto Rico. Not transit. Could involve storage Panama. If you can get UN support. Give other side occasion for pulling back.

Taylor: Scepticism of effectiveness. Diversion of effortx from immediate. Africa, impact on de Gaulle. Algeria, not his test sties. Might tell him he could use our test sites.

Stev: ...2 week negotiation withdrawal from Hemisphere
New guarantee, the integrity of Cuba
Dismantling of Italy and Turkey
Defanging of Cuba from
Standstill not positive acts. 48 hours, Inoperable becomes meaningless.

26.

McCloy: Doesn't agree. Got momentum. Threat must be removed before.

P. Not going to get out by quarantine.

Bundy : must defuse.

R. Negative report every hour.

McCloy: must have our own inspectors.

P. What Gov's proposal is to negotiate them out.

P. Insist on defusing, by separation and inspectors. They won't accept.
Then decision on POL or

P. Do we put out work continuing. Comes out from W.H.

No night flight, tonight.

Ball, take chairmanship.

Oct 26, Ball's Office (or 27?)

Ball: Unless we can return to political arrangement we will all fry.
Need a bridge back.

Distinction between bombers and missiles. Important all the way around
If no IRBMs we would have ridden with it.

Thompson: If you leave bombers, K has an out.

Bundy: Remove just MRBMs. If any serious damage
CAD over air field

Military--plan

2 plans

10 sorties
500 sorties

1. missiles alone, with variants
2. general air strike
3. blockade.

Notify Soviets. Must take out. If attacked by air must take

1. Avoid, unpredictable, irrational, uncontrollable, response.

recon every 2 hours day and night.

3. do it with forces so limited that we can go back to negotiating table.

29.

27.

Bundy: Good political plan
Assurances to Russians
Assurances to Castro
Assurances to Latinos
Education of NATO

Grozny

If you strike you pass her. If not you should search. Hold.

Post-strike problem

a) How we modify and limit Soviet action. Who should have communicated to whom. SAM sites must not be in party.

b) What preparations for other action.
military. proceed with negotiations. Posture in UN. They may get out.

1. Vebo in S.C.
2. Strong interest
3. Refusal of U Thant track
4. Work continues
5. Some notice to USSR?
6. If any on launcher

R. Would have to consult some of our allies.

Progressive blockade.

Rowen, Kitchin, Thompson

Negotiating track, Henry Owen

28. Saturday, Oct 27, 10 AM White House ExComm

McN Communicate to U Thant that Grozny approaching. important

P. Turkish. Fact is that we received different

R. Turkish problem is problem between NATO and Warsaw Pact

Dillon: May be preparation for counter-action if we hit bases in Cuba.
Don't consider as an alternative.

R. If we publish this letter. What else previous letterx2

Bundy: Knock down publicly.
Makes private difficult.

A.G. Offered this deal. Withdraw. if assurances
always given ..

Bases in Cuba involve Hemisphere.

Time running out.

Excellent you brought up Turkey. Sure ~~yxxxx~~ Turks and you withdraw.

N: First thing is have

Work must stop or we will not talk. Peril is he will say will do to
Turkey.

R: Turks should say part of of Western alliance and committed to NATO.
Withdraw warheads

Current threat to peace in Cuba. Not in Turkey. That is what has got
to stop.

If we take action makes more difficult move with world support.

Dillon: Dangerous sentence. means you consider aggressive.

Mc Stopped and operability defuzed.

P. How about Berlin

Dillon: affects security of Turkey, NATO and Berlin

1. Publicly knock down Turkish proposal.
2. Reinforce blockade.

no later 29th. Monday. not Tuesday

29.

Turkish one. Choice of bilateral. Or NATO. Explain to them. This problem, 6 hours. aftereffect.

McN: Do simultaneous. Get GRD up to it.

Are we going to send surveillance

- a) with cover
- b) without

Would like to have Turks and NATO agree this is the preferred course.

Have to make cessation of work. Then we can get on. Otheriwse he can tie us up.

Two plans: a) 1. Polaris off Turkish shores. Whether they attack or not, Turkey will be defended.

2. Plan of attack, conventional, against Russian warship, subx bases, NATO designed. But option for US alone.

312 ?

Oct 28, White House, 10 AM (not 27?) (27, 10 PM?)

T. A number of proposals have been made to you. Could you find out most urgently whether SU is prepared to immediately cease work on these bases and the missiles made inoperative while various solutions can be

NAC meeting ought to be called.

McN: Today, defusing Italian and Turkish ~~in~~ Jupiters and replacing with Polaris

Rusk/Foster: Missiles in Turkey and Italy will be turned over to UN for destruction.

Rusk: mobilization measures.

P. 1st go immediately to Turks

2d go to general NATO meeting.

Message to 1: may be necessary to fire. May involve risk.
Also taking up in NATO
and more effective

Monday morning.

Keisky, made proposal.

Fact is, no use, made proposal a year ago. Got to convince Turks to make the proposal.

30.

State Dept. Bundy, Tyler, Nitze, Oct 28 ((27??)) 3 PM

Making impossible possible.

What bears on problems today.
Turkish missiles are there, in context.

Phil Talbott

Special hazard for Turks.

Alliance cannot be reconstituted in form we have known it.

Put Polaris in East Med. Say to Turks this best alternative we can offer them. Unless you announce you are standing down these missiles for a temporary period. so as to avoid any misunderstanding.

Stick to your guns
Stand down your missiles
Plunging out, substituting Polaris

Would work under time
How to explain now

Have sent Polaris to Turkish waters and have stood down.

31.

White House, 10 AM 31 Oct

Columbian crisis. Minister of Defense.

Rockefeller critical that we didn't detect earlier.

McCone critical of intelligence community.

Are we creating sanctuary for Castro.

We have evidence now that they ~~has~~ may be violating the agreement and what are we going to do about it. What have we got to support the opposite conclusion.

R. Postpone press conference from Thursday to Friday.